PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS FOR JANUARY.

The Supreme Court of Illinois has recently made a very
thorough examination of the act of that state of June 4,
1879, P. L. I 13, which enacts (§ I) that " If any
Banks and
banker or broker or person or persons, doing a
Banking,
Receiving

banking business, or any officer of any banking
company, or incorporated bank doing business in
Insolvent,
Constitutional this state, shall receive from any person or perLaw
sons, firm, company, or corporation, or from any
agent thereof, not indebted to said banker, broker, banking
company, or incorporated bank, any money, check, draft, bill
of exchange, stocks, bonds, or other valuable thing which is
transferable by delivery, when at the time of receiving such
deposit, said banker, broker, banking company, or incorporated
bank is insolvent, whereby the deposit so made shall be lost
to the depositors, said banker, broker, or officer so receiving
said deposit, shall be deemed guilty of embezzlement, and
upon conviction thereof shall be fined, in a sum double the
amount of the sum so embezzled and fraudulently taken, and
in addition thereto, may be iniprisoned in the state penitentiary, not less than one nor more than three years. The failure, suspension, or involuntary liquidation of the banker,
broker, banking company, or incorporated bank within thirty
days from and after the time of receiving such deposit, shall
be brimafacie evidence of an intent to defraud, on the part of
such banker, broker, or officer of such banking company or
incorporated bank." This it holds to be constitutional, not
being a deprivation of property without due process of law,
in that it curtails an inherent right to contract, nor violating
the provision that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, nor that that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law.
Deposits

Whent,

122

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

It was also held that an indictment under this act alleging
that the accused corruptly, wilfully, fraudulently and feloniIndictment, ously received a deposit, etc., was sufficient, withSufficiency
out specifically alleging that the deposit was
received with intent to defraud; that an allegation that the
accused, "being persons then and there doing a banking business . .
. did receive" from one D. certain moneys, of the
property of said D., the said D. then and there not being
indebted to the accused, sufficiently alleged that the accused
were doing a banking business, and that the moneys were
received as a general deposit; and that an indictment alleging
that the accused were doing a banking business under the
name of " Meadowcroft Bros.," and that they were insolvent
at the time they received the deposit, was sufficient, without
alleging that the partnership of Meadowcroft Bros. was insolvent, as a partnership is not a legal entity, independent of the
persons composing it.
It was further held that the crime denounced by the act is
consummated when the banker receives the deposit, and is
unable, by reason of his insolvency, to repay the
Liability
under Act
entire sum deposited; that it is not necessary to
demand the return of the deposit, when the day after the
deposit a receiver was appointed for the bank, which was
hopelessly insolvent; that a deposit was lost to the depositor,
-Loss" of so as to warrant a conviction of the banker for
Deposit
receiving it, though pending the prosecution
therefor the full amount of the depositor's claim was tendered
to him; and that a general verdict fixing the amount of the
Verdict
fine (which by the act is double the amount of the
deposit,) and the term of imprisonment, without finding as to
the amount of the deposit, was valid: Meadowcroft v. People,
45 N. E. Rep. 303.
Statutes of this kind are to be found in most, if not all of
the states of the Union, and it has been uniformly held that
the provision that subsequent failure shall be fima fade evidence of insolvency at the time of the receipt of the deposit
does not render them unconstitutional: State v. Beach, (Ind.)
43 N. E. Rep. 949, 1896; State v. Buck, 120 Mo. 479, 1894.
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In order to sustain a conviction, the state must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt
(i) Actual insolvency at the time the money is received;
(2) The defendant's knowledge of the insolvency;
(3) The receipt of the money as a bank deposit : Common'wealth v. Junkin, 170 Pa. 194, 1895, reversing 16 Pa. C. C.
116, 1895.

When a banker or officer of a bank receives money over the
counter at a time when he knows the bank to be insolvent, but
keeps it separate from all other funds, with the intention of
returning it, and actually does return it, he cannot be convicted
of a criminal receipt of the money as a bank deposit; and if a
,clerk, against the order of the defendant, receives a deposit
and fails to keep it separate, but the next day the amount of
the deposit is returned to the depositor by the banker, the
latter is not guilty: Commonwealth v. Junkin, 170 Pa. 194,
1895, reversing 16 Pa. C. C. 116, 1895. It is not necessary,
however, to constitute a violation of the statute, that the
deposit should be received in the bank building or rooms; a
receipt of money on deposit for the bank outside of its rooms
is sufficient: State v. Yetzer, (Iowa,) 66 N. W. Rep. 737,
1896; State v. Smith, (Minn.) 64 N. W. Rep. lO22, 1895.
And it is not necessary that the defendant should receive it
himself; if any one under his authority, as a cashier or clerk,
receives it, he is liable: State v. Cadwell, 79 Iowa, 432, 1890.
Partners who are bankers may accordingly be jointly guilty of
-committing the offence denounced; one by directing, aiding
or advising, the other by actually receiving the deposit: State
v. Smith, (Minn.) 64 N. W. Rep. 1O22, 1896. Under the
Missouri statute, which provides, that "if any officer . ...
shall create or assent to the creation of any debts or indebtedmess by any such bank . . . . in consideration of or by reason
-of which indebtedness any money or valuable property shall
be received into such bank, heshall be guilty of larceny," (Rev.
Stat. Mo. 1889, § 3581,) it has been held that it is the dufy of
an officer, on becoming aware of the failing condition of the
bank, to revoke the authority of any employe under him and
subject to his authority to receive any further deposits; and
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his failure to do so will be construed as a continuing authority
to receive them, and as an assenting thereto: State v. Sattley,
131 Mo. 464, 1895.
A firm engaged in banking is insolvent, within the meaning
of these statutes, when it is unable to meet its liabilities as they
become due in the ordinary course of business; and bankers
who receive deposits, knowing themselves to be thus insolvent,
cannot escape the penalty of the law on the ground that they
believe that, with time and indulgence, they can settle all
demands: State v. Cadwel, 79 Iowa, 432, 189o. A deposit
is "lost" to the depositor, whenever it cannot be repaid on
demand, owing to the insolvency of the bank: State v.
Beach, (Ind.) 43 N. E. Rep. 949, 1896.
The mere act of receiving a deposit when insolvent does not
constitute the offence. Without any special provision to that
effect, the Supreme Court of Nebraska has held that the
statute of that state forbidding the receipt of deposits by an
insolvent bank, ought not to be construed to render an officer
of a banking association guilty of a crime for permitting a
debtor of the association to pay his debt thereto, even though
the association is at the time, to the officer's knowledge, insolvent; and that the rejection of evidence tending to show that
the deposit was received in payment of a debt to the bank is
error: Nichols v. State, (Neb.) 65 N. W. Rep. 774, 1896. To
the same effect is Commonwealth v. Schall, 12 Pa. C. C. 209,
1892; Commonwealth v. Delamater, 2 D. R. (Pa.) i 18, 1892.
But the indebtedness of a depositor to the bank, within the
meaning of the exception in the statute, must be such that
the bank has a legal right to apply the deposit thereon, such
as a matured obligation, so that the depositor has no right to
have the deposit repaid on demand, and it is consequently not
" lost" to him by the bank's insolvency: State v. Beach, (Ind.)
43 N. E. Rep. 949, 1896.
The officers of national banks are amenable to these statutes,
sinde Congress has not by any legislation declared it to be
criminal to receive a deposit knowing or having reason to
believe the bank insolvent, and its exclusive jurisdiction has
therefore not attached: State v. Bardwell,72 Miss. 535, 1895;
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and further, such acts are not void on the ground that they
are attempts to control and regulate the business of national
banks, and to prescribe a condition on which deposits may not
be received: State v. Fields, (Iowa,) 62 N. W. Rep. 653, 1895.
The owner of a private bank is liable, though he is doing an
unauthorized business, not having complied with the requirements of the statute in the organization of his bank: State v.
Buck, io8 Mo. 622, 1891; State v. Buck, 120 Mo. 479, 1894;
but a trust company, not authorized to receive deposits, is not
a bank or banking institution within these statutes, though it
has and exercises some of the functions of a bank; and the
fact that it receives deposits subject to check in violation of
its charter, does not render it a banking institution, so that its
officers are amenable thereunder: State v. Reid, (Mo.) 28
S. W. Rep. 172, 1894.
An indictment, though charging the offence in the exact
language of the statute, is fatally defective if it fails to aver the
essential fact that the bank was actually insolvent: State v.
Bardwell, 72 Miss. 535, 1895; and in case of a general partnership, it must be averred that both the partnership and the
individuals composing it are insolvent; but in case of a special
partnership the averment of the insolvency of the firm alone is
sufficient: Commonwealth v. Delamater, 2 D. R. (Pa.) i18,
1892. Unless the statute so provides, however, the indictment
need not allege that loss occurred to any one by reason of the
receipt of the deposit: State v. Myers, 54 Kans. 2o6, 1894.
A charge that the defendants were "engaged in the business
of carrying on a private bank," does not sufficiently allege
that they were "bankers" within the meaning of the act:
Commonwealth v. .Delamater,2 D. R. (Pa.) I18, 1892. Under
the Missouri statute, which makes it a criminal offence for any
officer of a bank to "receive or assent to the reception of any
deposit of money," etc., knowing the bank to be insolvent, a
conviction cannot be had on an indictment which merely
charges that the defendant did "receive "the deposit, on proof
that he " assented" to the reception thereof; the two offences
are distinct: State v. Wells, (Mo.) 35 S. W. Rep. 615, 1896;
and if the indictment charges that money was received "on
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deposit and for safe-keeping," it must be proved that the
money was received for safe-keeping, or as a special deposit, and
proof of a general deposit is insufficient: Ketting v. State, 88
Wis. 50Z, 1894.
In prosecutions under these acts, a deed of assignment
made by the defendant, tinder the general assignment law, the
inventory, appraisement, and all proceedings had thereunder,
are competent evidence on the question of the defendant's
insolvency; State v. Beach, (Ind.) 43 N. E. Rep. 949, 1896;
State v. Cadwell, 79 Iowa, 432, 1890. So, evidence that
depositors demanded their money, and that the bank employes
refused to pay them, is competent to show the failure of the
bank to meet its obligations in the ordinary course of business,
and this, whether the defendant personally heard the demands
or not: State v. Sattley, 131 Mo. 464, 1895. A bank is not
necessarily insolvent, however, because it does not retain on
hand all of the money of its depositors; its is not expected to
pay all its depositors at once, but simply to pay or provide for
its deposits and other debts as they are demanded in the usual
course of business; State v. Myers, 54 Kan. 2o6, 1894; and
in deciding the question of solvency, the capital stock and
surplus fund of a bank are not to be considered as liabilities
tending to show insolvency. The capital and surplus are
resources, which may be used to pay depositors and other
creditors when there has been loss by loans or otherwise:
State v. Myers, 54 Kan. 2o6, 1894.
The opinion of a witness as to the insolvency of the bank is
not admissible. The actual facts concerning the condition of
the bank at the time of the deposit must be shown: State v.
Myers, 54 Kan. 206, 1894. But an expert accountant, who
has examined the books of the bank, with reference to its
solvency, at different times, may, in connection with the data
upon which his opinion is founded, testify as to his opinion
concerning the solvency or insolvency of the bank; State v.
Cadwell, 79 Iowa, 432, 1890.
An instruction that a bank is not insolvent so long as it is
meeting its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary
course of business, and there is reasonable expectation on the
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part of the officers familiar with its affairs that it will continue
to do so, is correct: Minton v. Staklman, (Tenn.) 34 S. W.
Rep. 222, 1896; and so is one that the failure of the bank "is
prima fade evidence of the knowledge on the part of its
cashier that the same was in failing circumstances," when it is
explained that "prima fade evidence is such that it raises
such a degree of probability in its favor that it must prevail
unless it be rebutted or the contrary be proved:" State v.
Satley, 131 Mo. 464, 1895. When the deposit is in fact
received by a cashier or clerk, it is sufficient to instruct the
jury that the deposit must have been received on the authority
of the defendant, and that he must have received it knowing
of his insolvency: State v. Cadwell, 79 Iowa, 432, 1890.
The Iowa statute, (McClain's Ann. Code Iowa, §§ 1824,
1825,) differs from some others, in that it makes it an offence
for" any officer or managing party" of the bank, who, knowing
of its insolvency "shall knowingly permit the receiving of any
such deposit as aforesaid." Under this statute it has been
held, that an officer of an insolvent bank, who, knowing of its
insolvency, permits or connives at the receiving of deposits, is
guilty of the offence described, whether he is a managing party
or not; that when the deposit in question is not received personally by the officer charged with the offence, it is not necessary that the person who actually receives it knows that the
bank is insolvent, if the defendant knew it, and allowed such
person to receive it for the bank; and that when an officer of
a bank, knowing the bank to be insolvent, assists and advises
the keeping of the bank open for the receipt of deposits, and
while it is so kept open a deposit is received, that officer is
guilty under the statute, though the deposit is actually received
by another: State v. Yetzer, (Iowa,) 66 N. W. Rep. 737,
1896. Accordingly, it is proper to charge on the trial of a
banker for receiving deposits when insolvent, that, though the
deposit was received by the defendant's son, after the defendant
had instructed him to refuse deposits, if the defendant, on
learning that the deposit was so received, placed it among the
funds of the bank, he knowingly accepted and received it:
State v. Efert, (Iowa,) 65 N. W. Rep. 309, 1895.
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The provision that subsequent failure shall be &ima fade
evidence of insolvency applies to civil actions to recover the
deposit, as well as to criminal prosecutions: American Trust &

Say. Bk. v. Gueder & Paeschke Mfg. Co., (Ill.) 37 N. E. Rep.
227, 1894.

The liability of a steamboat company with respect to the
property of its passengers is analogous to that of an innkeeper; and it will therefore be liable, without
Carriers,
Liability for proof of negligence, if money for traveling exMoney Stolen penses, carried by a passenger on a steamboat, is
stolen from his stateroom at night, without negligence on his
part: Adams v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., (Court of Appeals
of New York,) 45 N. E. Rep. 369, affirming 29 N.Y. Suppl. 56.
A statute making such an unreasonable reduction in the
rates of toll charged by a turnpike company as will prevent it
Cotuttoal from maintaining its road, out of its receipts, in
Law.
proper condition for public use, or from earning
Of Law
any dividend on its stock, is repugnant to the constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law: Cozington & Lexington
Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford,(Supreme Court of the United
States,) 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 198.
An order made by a state court, under authority of a statute, requiring a railroad company to surrender a portion of its
right of way to private individuals, as a site for an elevator to
be erected and maintained by such individuals for their own
benefit, amounts to a taking of private property by the state
without due process of law: Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. State of
Nebraska, (Supreme Court of the United States,) 17 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 13o, reversing 29 Neb. 550.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has lately declared unconstitutional the act of that state of April 13, 1894, p. 135, in so
far as it gives a lien upon the property of the
Liberty of
Contract,
owner to subcontractors, laborers, and those who
Mech-aln'
furnish machinery, material, or tile to the conLien,
Subcontrac-

tors

tractor, irrespective of the contract between the
owner and the contractor, on the ground that the
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liberty to acquire property by contract can be restrained by
the legislature only so far as such restraint is for the common
welfare and equal protection and benefit of the people. All
to whom the contractor becomes indebted in the performance
of his contract are bound by the terms of the contract between
him and the owner: Palmer v. Tingle, 45 N. E. Rep. 313.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2, has
recently decided, in State v. Walsh, 37 S. W. Rep. II 12, that
lxclusive

the act of Missouri of March

12,

1895, which

prohibits pool selling except "on the premises or
within the limits or enclosure of a regular race course," is
unconstitutional, being a violation of the provision of the constitution forbidding the enactment of special laws granting
exclusive rights, privileges, or immunities.
Rights

The Supreme Court of Ohio has ranged itself on the side
of those who hold that the legislature has no authority to
abridge the power of a court created by the conoNeteMpt,
Inherent
Powerof

stitution to punish contempts summarily, since
such power is inherent, and necessary to the

Legislative

exercise of judicial functions; and accordingly

Interference

refused to adopt a construction of the Revised

Statutes, (§§. 6906, 6907,) which would impute to the legislature an intention to abridge that power: Hale v. State, 45 N.
E. Rep. 199.

In the same case it was also decided, overruling Baldwan v.
State, I I Ohio St. 68 1, 186o, that removing a witness from
Removal of

Witness

the county of his residence, where he was under
subpana to attend upon the trial of a cause

pending, with the purpose and effect of preventing his appearance upon the day of trial, being a wrongful act, which
obstructs the administration of justice, is a contempt of court.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in Stout v. Rayl, 45 N. E.
Rep. 515, has adopted the rule that when a deed is delivered
Deeds,
by the grantor to a third person, to be delivered
Delivery,
to the grantee on his death, and the grantor parts
Nqot to take
Efct til
with all dominion over it, and reserves no right to
Dfth
recall it or alter its provisions, the title passes at
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the time of the delivery of the deeds to the depositary. The
question arose upon the following state of facts. One S.
delivered to his wife deeds executed by himself and her, with
directions to keep them until his death, and then deliver them
to W. The deeds were placed in an envelope, and indorsed,
" Deeds to be delivered by W. after my death;" and on each
deed were the words, "After my death, this deed to be
delivered by W." After S.'s death, W. delivered the deeds to
the grantees named therein; and it was held that the deeds
were not invalid, as an attempt by the grantor to make a testamentary disposition of the land, without the legal formalities
of a will.
The cases on this subject are collected in an annotation in
33 Am. L. REG. N. S. 14i; see also 34 Am. L. REG. N. S.
638.

It is the duty of the secretary of state to certify to the
county officers all nominations regularly presented to him ;
and if he refuses to do so, he' may be compelled
Elections,
Nominations, by mandamus. That remedy will still lie, though
Duty of

streuy of a statute prescribes a different remedy, if the time
State
is so short that the latter would prove ineffective:
People v. McGaffey, (Supreme Court of Colorado,) 46 Pac.
Rep. 930.
In this case, the Silver Republican party in Colorado held
a convention, adopted an emblem, and made nominations,
which were duly certified to the secretary of state. The
Republican convention subsequently held adopted the emblem
formerly used by the party, and made nominations which were
also duly certified. Both parties had state organizations. The
secretary of state refused to certify the nominations made by
the Republican party, on the ground that it was superseded
by the Silver Republican party. The latter then applied to
the Supreme Court for a mandamus to compel him to certify
them, which was granted, on the ground that the secretary
had no authority to determine which of the two conventions
represented the Republican party; and that the remedy pro-
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vided by petition was inadequate, because of the nearness of
the election.
In passing upon objections to certificates of nomination, the
secretary of state is not confined to mere formal matters relating
to such certificates, but may determine from extrinsic evidence
whether the candidates therein named were in fact nominated
by a convention called and held according to party usage, and
claiming in good faith to represent a political party which cast the
requisite number of votes at the last election: State v. PRper,(Supreme Court of Nebraska,) 69 N. W. Rep. 378; State v. Piper,
(Supreme Court of Nebraska,) 69 N. W. Rep. 384; following
State v. Allen, 43 Neb. 65 1, 1895; Phelps v. Piper,48 Neb. 724,
1896. But it is no part of the duty of the secretary of state or of
the courts to decide which pf two rival state conventions of the
same party so called and held is entitled to recogniRiva
Conventions tion as the regular convention; and if two rival
factions of a political party in good faith nominate candidates
at conventions so called and held in accordance with the usages
of the party, and certify such nominations to the secretary of
state, he will certify to the county officers the names of the
candidates nominated by each: State v. Piper, (Supreme Court
of Nebraska,) 69 N. W. Rep. 378 ; following State v. Allen,
and Phelps v. Piper, supra. This rule has also been adopted
by the Supreme Court of Kansas: Sinms v. Daniels, 46 Pac.
Rep. 952; which further holds, that the officers appointed to
consider objections to nominations have no power to consider
Agreements of and enforce a written agreement made by the canC-ndidates
didates and committees of opposing factions of a
political party, providing for the settlement of their differences,
and for a determination of the question as to which set of candidates is entitled to be placed on the official ballot, and to use
the party name. Such a special tribunal cannot consider or
enforce an agreement of candidates to withdraw on the happening of a certain event or contingency, even though such
agreement is in writing. The Supreme Court of California, how
ever, in opposition to the previous consensus of authority, holds
that when certificates of nomination are presented to the registering officer by each of two conventions claiming to represent
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'the same political party, it is for him to determine which represents the party, at least in the first instance: McDonald v.
Hinton, 46 Pac. Rep. 870.
When a person appointed by the county committee of a
-party to open and preside over a convention until the election
Nominating of a temporary chairman refuses to recognize the
Convention,
authoritative character of the roll of delegates, but
Regularity
takes a viva voce vote on the question of the elec"tion of such chairman, and the majority of the delegates
refuse to accept the chairman so elected, retire to another part
of the house in which the convention is held, elect another
chairman, and proceed to nominate candidates, the nominations so made are the regular nominees of the party, and
their names are entitled to be placed on the official ballot,
rather than those nominated by the delegates who remain
under the first chairman: Frenck v. Roosevelt, (Supreme Court,
Special Term, New York County,) 41 N. Y. Suppl. io8o.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently decided that the
act of that state of April 17, 1896, (Laws, p.
Balots
-Constitutlonal 185,) prohibiting the printing of the name of any
Law
candidate more than once on the official ballot, is
-constitutional: State v. Bode, 45 N. E. Rep. 195.
In Cook v. Fisher, (Supreme Court of Iowa,) 69 N. W. Rep.
264, the initial of a candidate was printed as " R." on the
Distinguish- official ballots, instead of "A.," his correct initial.
Ing Marks At the election, some of the ballots cast were corrected by the judges of election by writing "A." before the
"R." with pencil, others by writing "A." over the "R." in
pencil, and the rest by stamping an "A." over the "R." with
a rubber stamp. It was decided that, though the change thus
created by the different methods of correction was distinguishable, yet, as no ballot in any one of the classes bore any
marks which would distinguish it from other ballots of the
same class, the ballots were not illegal on the ground that
they bore identifying marks.
It was also decided that though the ballot law of Iowa,
which prescribes particularly the manner in which the official
ballots shall be prepared, corrected, furnished and used, and
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provided that no other ballots shall be used or counted, is
mandatory in so far as it requires certain officers to prepare
and issue them in the prescribed manner, it cannot be construed as mandatory on voters in so far as it provides that no
other ballots shall be used or counted, so as to deprive them
of their right to vote because the officers who print the ballots
have made a technical mistake in printing the name of a candidate on the ballot; and that accordingly the changes made
by the judges did not necessitate the rejection of the entire
vote of the township, on the ground that those changes prevented the ballots from being "official " ballots, and consequently rendered them illegal.
An electric light company is required to perfectly insulate
its wires at points where persons are likely to come into conElectric Light

tact with them, and to use the utmost care in doing

so; and evidence that a person was injured by
coming in contact with an electric light wire, and
Evidence
that the insulation of the wire had become defective at a joint, because the wrapping had become loosened, is
conclusive proof that the company which maintained the wire
was negligent in insulating it, if the wire is so situate that persons are liable to come in contact with it. McLaughlin v.
LouisRille Electric Light Co., (Court of Appeals of Kentucky,)
37 S. W. Rep. 851.
In a recent case decided in the Circuit Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit, In re Rowe, 77 Fed. Rep. 161, the petitioner
Wires,

Negigence,

Extradition,

was extradited from Mexico, upon an information

for
Trial
Different

charging that he had counseled and advised another
to commit the crime of embezzlement of public

Principal and
Accessory

moneys, and upon affidavits tending to prove the
facts alleged, which the Mexican authorities held

Offence,

to show the commission of the crime, and that there were suspicions that R. was an accomplice in its commission sufficient
to justify his arrest and trial. After his return to the state of
Iowa, where the crime was committed, and from which he had
fled, R. was indicted for embezzlement, as a principal; the
statutes of the state, (McClain's Ann. Code Iowa, § 5699,)
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having abolished the distinction between principals and accessories, and making all concerned in the commission of a crime
.alike principals. Being held for trial under this indictment,
R. applied to the Circuit Court of the United States for discharge on habeas corpus, on the ground that he was held for
-trial for a different offence from that for which he was extradited. The Circuit Court refused the writ, on the ground
that the offences were not different; and this decision was
.affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Judge Hanford, of the Circuit Court for the District of
Washington, has lately ruled, that allegations in a petition for
removal of a cause to that court, stating that the
Federal
Courts,

Jurisdiction,

Citizenship

defendant has left the United States, and become

permanently domiciled in the Dominion of Canada,

-now resides there, and intends to become a naturalized citizen
of that country, does not show his alienage for the purpose of
conferring jurisdiction on the federal court; since the mere
fact that a defendant has, by removal from the United States,
become a resident of a foreign country, does not make him a
-citizen thereof, for the purpose of federal jurisdiction: Bishop
v. Averill, 76 Fed. Rep. 386.
Another attorney has been found bold enough, (or ignorant
-enough,) to assail the common law rule that a person who has
inflicted upon another a wound from which death
Homicide,
may and does ensue cannot defend a charge of
Defences
murder on the ground that the deceased might have recovered
'had he been treated according to the most approved surgical
methods. Of course, the court refused to listen to his claim:
.Statev. .Edgerton,(Supreme Court of Iowa,) 69 N.W. Rep. 280.
The Supreme Court of California has lately decided, that
-under Civil Code Cal. § 137, which authorizes a deserted wife
-Husbandand to sue the husband for the maintenance of herself
and of her children, if any, the wife is so far his
Wife,
Fraud on
Rights of

Wife

creditor as to be within § 3439 of the Civil Code,
which avoids conveyances made in fraud of credi-

-tors, and that a conveyance made by the husband with the
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design of defeating the wife's right of maintenance is avoided'
thereby; and that it is immaterial that the transfer was madebefore marriage, when there had been a previous agreement of
marriage, followed by cohabitation and pregnancy, which left
the wife no alternative but to carry out the agreement: Murray v. Murray, 47 Pac. Rep. 37.
The court also held that it is within the general powers of a
court of equity to grant the wife's claim for maintenance, irrespective of the statute; and that it might appoint a receiver
at the beginning of the action, since the plaintiff's demand
might be charged specifically upon the defendant's property.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recently had
before it a novel question. A husband brought an action for
violation of
Sale of Opium damages against a druggist, who, in
his express orders, sold laudanum and similar preto Wife,
Right of
parations to the wife, in consequence of which sheAction by
a confirmed victim of the opium habit,
became
Husband
Against Seller alleging
the loss of her services and companionship. The court below sustained a demurrer to the complaint; but this was reversed on appeal: Hollenan v. farward,
25 S. E. Rep. 972.
The reasoning by which the court supports its decision is
worth quoting: "A married woman still owes to her husband,
notwithstanding her greatly improved legal status, the duty
of companionship, and of rendering all such services in his
house as her relations of wife and mother require of her. The
husband, as a matter of law, is entitled to her time, her wages,
her earnings, and the product of her labor, skill, and industry.
He may contract to furnish her services to others, and may
sue for them, as for their loss, in his own fame. And it seems.
to be a most reasonable proposition of law that whoever wilfully joins with a married woman in doing an act which
deprives her husband of her services and of her companionship is liable to the husband in damages for his conduct. And.
the defendants owed the plaintiff the legal duty not to sell to
his wife opium in the form of large quantities of laudanum as
a beverage, knowing that she was, by using them, destroying
her mind and body, and thereby causing loss to the husband.
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The defendants and the wife joined in doing acts injurious to
the rights of the husband. From the facts stated in the complaint, the defendants were just as responsible as if they had
forced her to take the drug, for they had their part in forming
the habit in her, and continued the sale of it to her after she
had no power to control herself and resist the thirst; and
that, too, after the repeated warnings and protests of the husband. There is no difference between the principle involved
in this action and the principle upon which a husband can
recover from a third person damages for assault and battery
upon his wife."
There seems to be but one other case upon this subject:
Board v. Peck, 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 202, 1867; but that agrees
thoroughly with this.
According to a late decision of the court of Appeals of New
York, an injunction will lie at the suit of one claiming an
Injunction, interest in an estate by virtue of an agreement
Restraining with certain of the heirs-at-law, and also with a
Distribution
of Estate,
devisee under the will, to restrain distribution
oursaiction under a foreign probate decree alleged to have

over Foreign

Property

been procured by some of the defendants by

virtue of a fraudulent conspiracy, if part of the defendants
appear, and is not shown that the other defendants have not
been, or may not be. properly served with process, though the
bulk of the property involved is in the state where the decree
was rendered: Davis v. Cornue, 45 N. E. Rep. 449, reversing
37 N. Y. Suppl. 788.
Bartlett, Gray and' Haight, JJ.,
dissented.
A claim against a casualty insurance company for disbursement for surgical aid to a person injured, and for the defense
Insurance, of an action by the person for the injuries, is
Casualty,
governed by the same limitation as is prescribed
Limitation by the policy for the losses arising under the
policy, if no independent contract by the insurer to pay such
claim is shown: People v. Ameican Steam-Boiler Ins. Co.,
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(Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First
Department,) 41 N. Y. Suppl. 631.
It has been held by Judge Wheeler, in the Circuit Court for
the Southern District of New York, that a combination of
railroad companies into a joint traffic association,
Commerce,
Pooling of
Traffic

under articles of agreement by which each road
carries the freight it may get over its own line, at

its own rates, and has the earnings to itself, though
providing proportional rates, or proportional division of traffic,
is not a pooling of traffic on freights, or division of net proceeds
of earnings, within the prohibition of the interstate commerce
law, or of the Act of 1890, (26 Statutes at Large, 209), against
unlawful restraints and monopolies; and that the United States
cannot maintain a bill in equity to restrain an association of
railroads from carrying into effect an agreement alleged to be
illegal under the interstate commerce law, when it appears it
did not grant the charter of any of the roads, and has no proprietary interest in them. Its right in such a case is to prosecute for breaches of the law, not to provide remedies: United
States v. faint Traff Assn., 76 Fed. Rep. 895.
According to a decision of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, a stockholder in a corporation that owns stock in
another is disqualified to sit as a juror in a case
Jurors,
Disqualification in which the latter corporation is defendant;
McLaughlin v. Louisville Electric Light CO., 37 S. W. Rep. 85 I.
The Chief Justice of England has recently laid down some
very important principles with regard to the power of a justice
Justice of the of the peace to issue a search-warrant: Jones v.
peace,
German, [1896] 2 Q. B. 418. In this case, the
SearchWarrant

sworn information, upon which application for the

warrant was made to the justice, stated that the
informant "hath just and reasonable cause to suspect and
doth suspect that W. J. has in his possession certain property
belonging to the said T. V., (the informant,) and that he has
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requested the said W. J. to allow him to search several boxes,
which the said W. J. has had packed ready to be taken away,
but which he refuses to be looked through." The justice
issued the warrant, and it was executed. The plaintiff brought
an action of trespass against the justice, alleging that the information was insufficient, and that the warrant was consequently
illegal and without jurisdiction.
The Chief Justice, who
reserved the case for consideration after the jury had found for
the plaintiff, held, that a search warrant may be issued on an
allegation of reasonable suspicion of larceny; that it is not
necessary in such an information to allege that a larceny has
in fact been committed, but it is enough to allege a suspicion
that a larceny has been committed; that it is not necessary to
specify in the information the particular goods for which a
search is desired; that the information in question substantially averred that the informant suspected that certain property
of his had been stolen; and that it was sufficient to give the
justice jurisdiction; and accordingly gave judgment for the
defendant.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey has latelyheld, that when a corporation is engaged in publishing a newspaper, and it can be inferred from the evidence that
Libel,
Newspaper, a libelous article published therein has been edited
Corporation and published by some person employed for that
purpose, the corporation will be liable to the person libelled to
the same extent that an individual would be who had personally made such a publication. "A corporation engaged in
publishing a newspaper obviously must act by selected agents..
Its directors or managers cannot formally pass on each
publication, or determine what it to be admitted therein. Such
determination is necessarily committed to its agents. In making such determination, they are acting within the scope of'
their employment. The intent with which they publish .must be
imputed to the corporation which employs them to make the
publication of the newspaper. If the intent is malicious, the
corporation must be liable therefor, as it is for other tortious
acts of its agents, done within the scope of their authority, and
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for the purposes for which the corporation was created and the
agents were employed:" Hoboken Printing & Pub. Co. v.
Kahn, 35 At]. Rep. 1053.
According to the Court of Appeals of Kansas, (Northern
Department, W. D.,) a cause of action against an
Limitatio
Accrual of abstractor of titles for giving a wrong certificate of
Cause of title accrues at the date of the delivery, and not at
Action

the time the negligence is discovered or the
damage arises: Provident Loan Trust Co. v. Walcott, 47 Pac.
Rep. 8.
The Supreme Court of the United States has lately held,
that Pub. Stat. Mass. c. 157, §§ 96, 98, invalidating transfers
of property made with a view to preferring crediNational
Banks,
tors by any one insolvent or in contemplation of
Security,
Effect of State
Laws

insolvency, when that fact is known to the transferee, does not conflict with Rev. Stat. U. S.

§ 5137, which grants to a national bank the right to hold
such real estate as "shall be mortgaged to it in good faith by
way of security for debts previously contracted," and such as
"shall be conveyed to it in satisfaction of debts previously contracted in the course of its dealings;" and that it does not
impair any function of national banks as instrumentalities of
the federal government. Such banks are therefore subject to
the provisions of the Massachusetts statute: McClellan v.
Chipman, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 85, affirming 159 Mass. 363.
The Chief Justice of England has ruled, in Thze Queen v.
fameson, [1896] 2 Q. B. 425, under § ii of the Foreign
Enlistment Act, 1870, which provides that: "If
Neutrality
Laws,
any person within the limits of Her Majesty's
Expedition
Against
FriendlyState

dominions, and without the license of Her Majesty, prepares or fits out any naval or military

expedition to proceed against the dominions of any friendly
state, the following consequences shall ensue: (i) Every person engaged in such preparation or fitting out, or assisting
therein, or employed in any capacity in such expedition, shall
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be guilty of an offence," if there be an unlawful preparation of
an expedition by some person within Her Majesty's dominions,
that any British subject who assists in such preparation will be
guilty of an offence, even though he renders that assistance
from a place outside Her Majesty's dominions.
The Court of Appeals of New York has adopted the strict
rule, favored by the weight of authority, which holds that a
policy, is
PublicOfficer, public officer, on the ground of public
Liability for liable for public moneys entrusted to him, and
PublichMoneys lost through the failure of the bank in which he
had deposited them, though he was not negligent: Tillinghast
v. Merrill, 45 N. E. Rep. 375, affirming 28 N. Y. Suppl.

1089.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, a contract between railroad companies for interchange of traffic and apportionment of earnings
Railroad
Agreements,
is not so indefinite in its terms that it cannot be
Specific
Performance

enforced, merely because the exact details by
which each road shall receive and transport promptly the
others' traffic, and the manner of apportioning the earnings
on a mileage basis, cannot be particularized by the court:
Cumberland Valley R. R. Co. v. Gettysburg & HarrisburgRy.
Co., 35 AUt. Rep. 952. This is in accordance with the ruling
of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Union Pac.Ry.
Co. v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 163 U. S. 564, 1896.
In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Miller, 76
Fed Rep. 439, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit lately ruled, that in an action against a
Railroad
Relief
railroad company by one of its employes to recover
Association,
Validity of
Pleas,

damages for personal injuries through negligence,
a plea that the employe had accepted benefits as a

Sufficiency

member of a relief association organized by the

company, under an agreement that he thereby relinquished
his right of action, does not form a valid defence when it fails
to show that, if the association was at any time short of funds
to meet its obligations to a member, that member could main-
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tain an action against the company, or fails to set out the
arrangement between the company and its employes with such
fullness and certainty that the court may be able to see that
the arrangement is fair and reasonable, and not against public7
policy, nor voidable for want of valuable consideration.
The concurring opinion of Caldwell, Circuit Judge, is worth
quoting: "Assuming that contracts of this character are valid,.
this case is rightly decided on the ground stated in the opinion.
But such contracts, in so far as they attempt to release a railroad company from liability for injuries inflicted on its employes.
through its negligence, are without sufficient consideration,
against public policy, and void, and must ultimately be so
declared by all courts." This dictum, while not consonant
with the weight of authority, seems founded in reason and
justice, and will prevail in time. The current of opinion is
just now setting the other way. See 34 AM. L. REG. N. S.
231.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia holds, in
accord with the weight of decision, that in the absence of
Rewards,
express authority conferred by charter or by genoffer by

Municipal
Corporation

eral law, a municipal corporation has no power to.
,
plcroao

offer and pay a reward for the arrest and conviction of persons who violate the criminal laws of the state;.
that such authority cannot be inferred from the " general welfare " clause of a charter, the matter being properly a subject
of state and not of municipal jurisdiction; and that the offer
by a city council of a reward which it has no authority to pay
is ultra vires, and creates no obligation enforceable against the
city: City of Winchester v. Redmond, 25 S. E. Rep. Iooi.
At last the use of the journals of the legislature has been,
acknowledged. In State v. Wendler, (Supreme Court of WisStatutes,

consin,) 68 N. W. Rep. 759, it appeared that in,

Enactment,
Approval,
Journals of
Legislature

numbered 221 one on page 367, the other or
page 397. The first was held invalid, because it

the laws of 1895, there were printed two statutes

differed materially from the engrossed bill.

The second was.
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:also held invalid, after a careful investigation into its legislative history, because (i) the record did not show that the
legislature ever passed it, and (2) because the governor never
approved the bill which the legislature attempted to pass. the
statute as approved and printed containing amendments which
had been stricken out by a conference committee of the two
houses.
If this decision is correct, the doctrine of the sacredness of
an enrolled and approved bill is nugatory; if that doctrine is
valid, this decision is wrong. But it needs no microscope to
discover on which side justice lies, when the eyes are freed
from the dust of legal quibbling.
The Supreme Court ofNorth Carolina also, has recentlybacked
water very strongly in regard to the sacredness of an enrolled
Statutes, bill. It now holds that when a state constitution
requires, in the enactment of certain laws, that the
Enactment,
Legislative
Journals,
Effect

yeas and nays shall be entered on the journals,
those journals are conclusive, not only as against

a printed copy of the statutes published by authority of law,
but as against a duly enrolled act: Union Bk. of Richmond v.
Commissioners of Town of Oxford, 25 S. E. Rep. 966.
This is a very important recession from the position apparently taken in Carrv. Coke, i16 N. C. 223, 1895, which provoked a good deal of discussion about a year ago. The court
seems to feel that such is the case; for it takes great pains to
point out the distinction between the two cases, and carefully
limits the effect of that decision. " This case has no analogy
to Carr v. Coke, i i6 N. C. 223, 22 S. E. 16. That merely
holds that when an act is certified to by the speakers as having been ratified, it is conclusive of the fact that it was read
three several times in each house, and ratified: Const. art. 12,
§ 23, and so it is here; the certificate of the speakers is conclusive that this act passed three several readings in each
house, and was ratified. The certificate goes no further. It
does not certify that this act was read three several days in
each house, and that the yeas and nays were entered in the
journals. The journals were in evidence, and showed affirmatively to the contrary." This opinion was delivered by one
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of the judges who dissented in Carrv. Coke, and may therefore be taken as authoritative as to the extent of that decision.
We are glad to know what it does mean; for the language
used was broad enough to cover anything-as broad as
charity.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, following Boring v. State,
Amendment
141 Ind. 640, 1895, holds that a statute which
of Repealed
Statute

purports to amend a repealed statute is pro tanto
unconstitutional; but that if the rest of the act can stand alone,
it will be valid: Smith v. McClazn, 45 N. E. Rep. 41.
The doctrine that the amendment of an act already repealed
by a prior amendment is a nullity, on the grounds (i) that it
is a nullity, as an attempt to amend that which has no existence, and (2) that if it be attempted to uphold it as an
amendment of the amendatory act, it does not comply with
the constitutional provision that an amendment shall refer to
the original act by its title, seems to be peculiar to Indiana,
where it has been persistently adhered to: Draper v. Falley,
33 Ind. 465, 1870; Board v. Markle, 46 Ind. 96, 1874;
Blakemore v. Dolan, 50 Ind. 194, 1875; Fordv. Booker, 53
Ind. 395, I876; Cowley v. Rushville, 6o Ind. 327, 1878; Niblack v. Goodman, 67 Ind. 174, 1879; Brocaw v. Board, 73
Ind. 543, 1881 ; Lawson v. Deblois, 78 Ind. 563, 1881;
McIntyre v. Marine,93 Ind. 193, 1883; Feibleman v. State, 98
Ind. 516, 1884; Boringv. State, 141 Ind. 64o, 1895; Stony
Creek Twp. v. Kabel, (Ind.) 43 N. E. Rep. 559, 1896. This
view wholly disregards the obvious reply that the amendment
may stand as an independent enactment, at all events, the
purpose to amend being rejected as surplusage, and that the
reference to the title of the original act sufficiently indicates
a purpose to amend that which takes its place, the date being
mere surplusage; accordingly, most other courts have taken
a common sense view of the situation, holding that the evident intention of the legislature is to amend the amendatory
statute; and therefore that the date of the act as stated should
be rejected as surplusage: State v. Warford, 84 Ala. 15,
1887; Harp~erv.State, (Ala.) i So. Rep. 857, 1896; Bassett v. Jacksonville, 19 Fla. 664, 1883 ; Comm. v. Kenneson,
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143 Mass. 418, 1887; People v. Upson, 79 Hun, (N. Y.) 87,

1894; or that an amendment does not repeal the amended act
so as to preclude its re-amendment: Fletcher v. Prather, io2
Cal. 413, 1894; State v. Brewster, 39 Ohio St. 653, 1884.
-Ofcourse, in such a case the prior amendment is repealed by
the latter: Wilkinson v.Keler, 59 Ala. 306, 1877; Blake v.
Brackett, 47 Me. 28, 1859; Kamerick v. Castleman, 21 Mo.
App. 587, I886. An express repeal of the original statute
repeals the amendment: Greer v. State, 22 Tex. 588, 1858.
The Supreme Court of New York, (Appellate Division,
'Second Department,) has very wisely decided, that the penalty
for refusal to give a transfer to "any passenger
Street
Railroads,
desiring to make one continuous trip" between
Transfer,

any two points on a street railroad system, imposed
by the Laws of New York of 1892, c.676, § 104,
-cannot be recovered by one who demanded a transfer with the
sole object of recovering for refusal: Meyers v.Brooklyn
Heights R. R. Co., 41 N. Y. Suppl. 798.
Ref usal,

Penalty

A joint action will not lie against the separate owners of
dogs which unite in destroying the property of a third person.
Each person is liable only for the damage done
Torts,
Joinder of
by his own dog, and not for that which is done by
Actions
the dogs which do not belong to him. This rule
applies to all cases of trespass by animals. "The reason
which makes one who personally aids in or about the wrong
done by another liable for the whole amount of the injury done,
does not apply in a case like that under consideration. In the
,case of a joint tort, each offender's liability arises out of the fact
that his participation in the wrongful act was voluntary and
intentional; and the law, as a punishment for his wrongdoing,
as well as for the protection of the rights of the injured party,
makes him answerable for all the consequences of that act.
But, in the case of animals which wander off and unite in perpetrating mischief, there is no actual culpability on the part
of their owners. Liability in such a case only exists by reason

146

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

of the negligence of the owners in permitting their animals to
stray away and commit the depredations, and it has therefore
always been held, when the question has come before the
courts, that joint action will not lie against separate owners of
dogs which unite in committing mischief:" State v. Wood,
(Supreme Court of New Jersey,) 35 At. Rep. 654; citing
Denny v. Correll,9 Ind. 72, 1857; Buddington v. Shearer, 20
Pick. (Mass.) 477, 1838; Van Steenburgh v. Tobias, 17 Wend.
(N. Y.) 562, 1837; Auclmuty v. Ham, I Denio, (N. Y.) 495,
1845; Partenheimer v. Van Order, 2o Barb. (N. Y.) 479,
1855 ; Adams v. Hall, 2 Vt. 9, 1829.

The beneficiary in a life insurance policy procured with
stolen moneys is not an innocent third person as against the
person from whom the moneys were stolen, but
Trust,
Following
takes the policy subject to the means by which
Trust Property, Life
InsuranCe,

it was procured; and when the premiums on a
policy are paid with stolen moneys, and the

Paid with
amount of the thefts equal the amount of the
Stolen Money policy, the person from whom the moneys were

stolen is entitled to the proceeds of the policy: Dayton v.
H. B. Claflin Co., (Supreme Court, Trial Term, New York
County,) 41 N. Y. Suppl. 839.
When a loan, payable in monthly instalments, including
interest due at the time of payment, is made at the highest
Usury
legal rate of interest, and notes are given for each
instalment, including the interest due at the maturity of each
note, the fact that the notes provide for interest after maturity
in case of default does not render the loan usurious, since, if
the notes are paid at maturity, the contract is legal, and therefore the default of the borrower will not make it illegal: Crider
v. San Antonio Real Estate, Bdg. & Loan Assn., (Court of
Civil Appeals of Texas,) 37 S. W. Rep. 237.
In a proceeding in equity to remedy a mistake made by the
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foreman of the jury in announcing the verdict, the jurors are
as
competent witnesses to prove that the verdict
Verdict,
verdict,
their
not
was
Evidence of read out by the foreman
but the result of an oversight on his part: HamJurors
burg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co. v. Pelzer Mfg. Co., (Circuit Court
of Appeals, Fourth Circuit,) 76 Fed. Rep. 479.

According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Illinois, a parol contract to make no will that will deprive one
of property which she would take as heir if there
Will,
estate and
Contract not was no will, having relation to real
personalty and being within the statute of frauds
to make,
Statute of
Frauds,
Part
Performance

as to the former, is indivisible, and therefore
wholly void; and the legal adoption by a grandmother of her deceased son's only daughter, as
her own child, is not such a part performance as will take
such a contract out of the statute: Dicken v. McKinlay, 45 N
E. Rep. 134.
In another case before the same court, Lawrence v. Smith
45 N. E. Rep. 259, a testator had bequeathed the bulk of
his estate upon trusts which were declared void
DisinheritBy a
Trusts, as violating the rule against perpetuities.
VodSance,
.Right of
clause in the will he disinherited one of his children; but it was held that that disheritance could
Child
not affect the right of the child to share in that portion of the
estate as to which, by reason of the invalidity of the trust, the
testator died intestate.
The Court of Appeals of Colorado has lately held that
when a corporation maintains a hospital for the treatment of
its employes, which is supported, either in whole
Witness,
Competency, or in part, by contributions reserved from the
Physician and
wages of the employes, the relation of physician
Patient,
and patient exists between the surgeon in charge
Privileged
Communica-

of the hospital and an employe, who is treated by
him for an injury; and the surgeon is therefore
not competent to testify, except with the consent of the
tion,

ReliefHospital
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patient, as to any information regarding the injury acquired
by reason of his attendance on the patient: Colorado Fuel&
Iron Co. v. Cummings, 46 Pac. Rep. 875.
Ardemus Stewart.

